PC-X/9

Preparatory Commission for the PC-X/9

Organisation for the Prohibition 29 March 1995

of Chemical Weapons Original: ENGLISH

Tenth Session

(3 - 7 April 1995)

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON INSPECTORATE RECRUITMENT AND RELATED MATTERS

1. Introduction

On 17 March 1995 the Executive Secretary held informal consultations on the progress made by the Secretariat on recruitment for the Inspectorate and on other related matters. The consultations took the form of a presentation by the Executive Secretary with the aid of 10 view graphs (Attachment in English only to this Note), followed by a discussion of the issues raised.

2. Presentation by the Executive Secretary

2.1 The Executive Secretary recalled that on a number of previous occasions he had appealed to Member States to submit as soon as possible the applications of candidates qualified for the posts in the Inspectorate. The Secretariat had been hoping to receive more such applications, in particular from those Member States which initially submitted few applications. In particular, as would be come apparent in the course of his presentation, more applications were required for posts in the Inspectorate which require extensive chemical industry experience.

2.2 In order to be able to reach out to as many potential qualified applicants as possible, the Secretariat had taken the following steps to publicise the Inspectorate trainee positions, at no cost to the Commission:

(a) publicity packets had been distributed to 15 chemical industry/international contacts;

(b) Inspectorate trainee advertisements had been sent to 1,500 people (in 40-50 different countries) as a part of the background material for the "Fifth International Symposium on Protection Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents" to be held in Stockholm in June 1995;

(c) application and publicity packets had been provided to participants at regional seminars and national pilot training courses;

(d) an announcement had been made on four Internet (E-mail) career bulletin boards; and

(e) a free advertisement had been published in Chemistry & Industry magazine.

2.3 In relation to the applications received by the Secretariat up to 15 February 1995, the Executive Secretary noted that, in addition to the information provided in view graphs 2 and 4, 71% of the total number of applications came from 15 Member States while 37% came from two Member States of the Commission, India and the United States.

2.4 The following generic criteria had been used by the Secretariat in its initial screening of the applications:

(a) qualifications: the clear evidence of an educational qualification/diploma as required in the corresponding vacancy notices, with added value for higher educational qualification/diploma level;

(b) professional experience: an assessment had been carried out taking into account all relevant information;

(c) age: the general age limit used in the selection process had been 51, with the age limit of 53 for competitive candidates in those inspector categories where shortages were evident; and

(d) language: the evaluation was based only on the information included in the application form. Language ability would be checked during the interview.

2.5 The reasons for the establishment of the particular age limit criterion outlined in paragraph 2.4(c) above were as follows: firstly, the age of applicants as contained in their CVs meant that they will be at least one or two years older at EIF; secondly, it could be reasonably assumed that the OPCW Staff Regulations would establish a mandatory retirement age of 60 years; thirdly, the Secretariat's current thinking in regard to inspector recruitment was that inspectors would initially receive a three-year contract with the possibility of a two-year renewal and, in exceptional cases, further renewals for periods of two years subject to need and satisfactory performance; fourthly, in the absence of an age limit, the Health and Safety Office would be forced to conduct or have conducted on its behalf fitness testing and special medical examinations for all older inspector candidates which were not part of the standard UN medical examination. The Commission's Budget did not contain provisions for such fitness testing.

2.6 The initial screening process was carried out under the supervision of the Director of the Verification Division by panels composed of the Special Consultant to the Director, members of the Personnel Branch (in particular its Recruitment Section) and Verification Division specialists. The applications were categorised as competitive, borderline or regret. Medical history forms of competitive and borderline candidates were screened by the Head of the Health and Safety Office.

2.7 The Executive Secretary then provided an overview of the information contained in the following view graphs:

(a) View graph 3: Status of All Inspectorate Applications after Initial Screening

(b) View graph 4: Total Inspectorate Applications Before Screening

(d) View graph 6: Inspectorate Applications by Gender

(e) View graph 7: Positions and Number of Trainees and of Inspectors (Reminder)

(f) View graph 8: Status of Inspectorate Applications by Position before and after Screening

(g) View graph 9: Active Applications Versus Trainee Position Vacancies

(h) View graph 10: Competitive and Borderline Applications versus Trainee Position Vacancies

2.8 The results of the initial screening indicated that the number of qualified applications remaining in four categories - Medical Specialist, Analytical Chemist, Technician, and Paramedic - was sufficient. There were shortages of qualified applicants in the other categories: CW/Munitions Specialist, Chemical Production Technologist, Chemical Production Logistician and Industrial Chemist.

2.9 At the next stage of the screening process the above-mentioned shortages could become even more acute because, in addition to the professional qualifications of individual candidates, other factors would have to be taken into account. These factors include the requirement for recruitment on as wide a geographical basis as possible (which could result in limiting the number of inspectors from any one country), as well as restrictions on States Parties being inspected by their own nationals, and a restriction on the participation in OPCW inspections by inspectors who happen to be nationals of parties to a bilateral agreement.

2.10 The Executive Secretary drew attention to the following imbalances that had been identified during the initial screening process:

(a) there was a shortage of applications from certain regions: Latin America and the Caribbean (4% of total applications only), Africa (7%) and to a lesser extent Eastern Europe (10%), while there was a large number of applications from WEOG (40%) and Asia (39%). As mentioned earlier, two countries had supplied 37% of the total number of applications received;

(b) 52% of the total applications received could not be categorised as either competitive or borderline;

(c) the ratio of active applications to position vacancies was different for each category of Inspectorate posts. In some cases, e.g. Medical Specialist and Technician, the ratio (25:1) was sufficient, whereas in others, e.g. Chemical Production Logistician, the ratio (1:1) was insufficient (view graph 8);

(d) a number of applications could not be properly assessed due to the lack of information contained in them;

(e) it was apparent that in certain cases recruitment information did not reach the right people, in particular in the chemical industry; and

(f) the shortage of qualified applicants in key areas could also have been due to lack of clarity about OPCW staff conditions and regulations, uncertainty about the date of actual recruitment, and unattractive remuneration packages.

2.11 In view of the situation that had emerged in regard to inspector recruitment, the Executive Secretary informed the participants that he had decided:

(a) to maintain the 31 January 1995 deadline for the submission of applications for those positions in the Inspectorate for which there was no shortage at present;

(b) to extend to 15 May 1995 the deadline for other positions for Training Group A candidates where shortages exist; and

(c) to postpone the selection/recruitment process until after the trigger point (EIF minus 6) for Training Group B (80 Chemical Production Technologists and Chemical Production Logisticians) to be trained at EIF.

2.12 The Executive Secretary said that extending the deadline for applications of trainees for Training Group B would be particularly beneficial, as it would allow for several months of additional recruitment efforts to identify sufficiently qualified applicants. He also hoped that by the trigger point the exact dates for hiring and training would be known, and that the draft terms and conditions for employment would have been finalised by the Commission. Further, head-hunter companies could be efficiently used; geographic distribution could be adjusted as necessary; and the burden of selection and recruitment tasks would be spread more evenly during the period prior to entry into force of the Convention.

2.13 The Executive Secretary then outlined the measures which the Secretariat would take in the near future in the process of inspector trainee selection:

(a) compiling the short list. The list would be compiled using all competitive and, as required, borderline candidates taking into account sequentially the following factors:

(i) geographical distribution;

(ii) government clearance (the Secretariat will inform the Government of the selected candidate and will ask the Government to confirm that he/she is a citizen of that country. If the Secretariat does not receive a reply within 30 days of such a request being made, it will assume that the applicant's citizenship has been confirmed);

(iii) credentials (copies of diplomas, degrees, language diplomas, identity photos, certified copy of passport, and vaccination records will be requested from selected applicants);

(b) selecting the final list (including a reserve list) - the interview process:

(i) finalists will be selected through interview and language tests. The interview panels will consist of staff members from the Verification Division and the Personnel Branch (Recruitment Section). Due to the large number of interviews to be conducted, it will be necessary to appoint four to five panels consisting of a total of 12 - 16 staff members;

(ii) depending on the countries of origin of short-listed candidates, the interviews could take place either in The Hague and/or at different locations all over the world. The agreement of pre-selected Member States with regard to the support for the organisation of interviews, including the cost-free availability of facilities and granting of visas as necessary, will be an essential prerequisite for the efficient conduct of the interview process;

(c) selecting the trainee list (including a reserve list). Trainees will be selected from finalists after a medical examination in their country by a UN physician (special arrangements should be made for candidates from countries where no UN physicians are available).

2.14 The Executive Secretary stressed that, on the basis of current estimates, the entire inspector selection and recruitment process would take at least ten months if organised in the most efficient manner possible (see view graph 11). In reality this task could turn out to be even more demanding if other duties of the Recruitment Section and of the Verification Division staff were also taken into account.

2.15 The optimal numbers of candidates at each stage of the future selection process should be:

(a) on the short list (two for one position) 540

(b) finalists (after interview and language test) 270

(d) trainees 240

2.16 The original estimates of the numbers of short-listed candidates and trainees had been too low and the relevant budgetary provision included appropriations for only 400 interviews and 240 medical examinations, and did not include the funds necessary to interview and conduct medical examinations for the additional 26 inspector trainees approved by the Commission in 1994.

2.17 The possibility of postponing the recruitment of trainees for Training Group B until after the trigger point could allow the Secretariat to use the current Budget for the recruitment of trainees in Training Group A only. However, additional expenditures would nevertheless be required to arrange for the necessary interviews and medical examinations not budgeted for at present. The total additional funds would be in the order of Dfl. 300,000.

2.18 Finally, the vacancy notices indicated that there would be three different scales of salaries for trainees, depending on their qualifications and experience: P-4, P-3 and GS. Having reviewed the potential advantages and disadvantages of following this route, the Executive Secretary suggested that Member States might wish to reflect on the merits of the alternative approach of paying all trainees to be recruited to professional posts the same standard salary for the duration of the training course. This salary would be somewhat higher than the 75% P-3 salary currently offered in the vacancy notices, but less than the full P3 Grade (Step 1) salary. Under this approach, it would be necessary for the Secretariat to select each trainee having in mind the likely grade to which the trainee might ultimately be appointed, but the final decision on the level of appointment, which would be made on the basis of performance during the course, would not be taken until the end of the course.

3. Comments by delegations

3.1 Several delegations expressed interest in receiving formal notice of the status of their national candidates after the initial screening process, to facilitate their search for new candidates and to prepare active candidates for interview. The Executive Secretary assured them that they would receive this information in the near future and in any case before any more regret letters are sent out to individuals.

3.2 One delegation asked about language qualifications, in particular in regard to languages other than English, in view of the fact that in some instances inspectors might find themselves in situations where adequate interpretation would not be available. It was pointed out that there was no provision for interpreters in inspection teams. The Executive Secretary's response was that, according to the Secretariat's estimates, the majority of inspections would be carried out either in English-speaking countries or in countries which had indicated that English would be the preferred language for communication between the inspection team and the inspected State Party. In fact, in terms of relative importance from an inspection standpoint, languages, including the six working languages of the Commission, could probably be grouped in the following order of priority: English; Russian and Chinese; Japanese and German; Arabic, French and Spanish. The English skills of applicants would be noted during the interviews. Applicants who claimed fluency in other languages will be tested - to the extent possible - during the interview process.

3.3 One delegation enquired about the potential impact of complementary verification on inspector selection and recruitment. The Executive Secretary replied that at present the number of trainees to be recruited as inspectors was based on the Commission's assumption that the bilateral agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States on the destruction and non-production of chemical weapons would be in force at EIF. On current thinking US and Russian nationals in the OPCW Inspectorate would therefore be excluded from participating in OPCW inspection teams engaged in complementary verification, and this factor would in itself impose a limit on the number of US and Russian nationals that could be recruited as CW/Munitions Specialists. For the same reason, there would also be limitations on the numbers of US and Russian nationals which could be recruited as Analytical Chemists and, for Group A, Chemical Production Technologists.

3.4 It was suggested that, in order to attract qualified candidates for positions in the Inspectorate where shortages were evident, the Secretariat might wish to consider:

(a) using additional recruitment methods;

(b) revising the vacancy notices to clarify the job titles and/or requirements;

(d) identifying additional incentives with a view to offering potential applicants a more attractive employment package; and

(e) authorising additional expenditures for a stepped-up advertising campaign.

3.5 Referring to these suggestions, the Executive Secretary said that a head-hunter agency would be employed to assist in recruiting qualified candidates. In this case a flat fee would be paid and then a fixed amount per successful applicant. It should be kept in mind that potential applicants working in the chemical industry would be in danger of losing their jobs once their employers discovered that they were actively looking at opportunities for outside employment.

3.6 He indicated that the Secretariat would revise the Chemical Production Technologist and Chemical Production Logistician position titles to clarify the types of skills which were required and would re-issue these revised vacancy notices to all Member States.

3.7 The Executive Secretary stressed that secondment would be acceptable only if the staff member on secondment was not receiving any remuneration (with the exception of a pension) or instructions from his/her government while working for the OPCW. The guaranteed right of return of seconded personnel could, however, make the Inspectorate positions more attractive to seconded personnel due to enhanced employment security.

3.8 Many delegations expressed concern over the issue of an age limit for Inspectorate applicants. A more flexible approach towards age was favoured. It was suggested that fitness to carry out inspections was a better indicator of suitability for recruitment than an arbitrary age limit, although it was recognised that there was a link between age and fitness. One delegation, citing transparency, drew attention to the fact that an age criterion was never explicitly stated in the vacancy notices.

3.9 The Executive Secretary replied that the Secretariat's approach to screening on the basis of age had been developed after substantial numbers of applications had been received and the need for such screening became apparent. Specifically, applicants were screened keeping in mind that they should be able to complete a minimum three-year contract with a possible two-year extension and, in exceptional cases, another two years, before reaching the likely retirement age of 60. (Due to the high cost of training to the Commission - Dfl. 80,000 per trainee - it would be more economical to keep inspectors for the maximum length of contract.) Also taken into consideration was the fact that the duties of inspectors would include a rigorous physical regimen including extensive long-distance travel, the wearing of special protective gear, etc. To ensure the medical suitability of older candidates, there would be a need for extra fitness testing. Funds for this type of testing had not been included in the Secretariat's Budget. Another reason for the establishment of the age limit was the substantial increase in insurance premiums that would arise out of the recruitment of older candidates. (Following these informal consultations, a review of the age criterion was carried out by the Executive Secretary and the age limits raised. The new age criteria are contained in the Report of the Executive Secretary for the Intersessional Period 3 December 1994 to 31 March 1995 (PC-X/10).)

3.10 One delegation enquired whether the Secretariat was currently automatically screening out applicants who were married to other applicants or to current Secretariat staff members. The Executive Secretary responded by saying that the Secretariat was not screening out spouses at this stage of the selection process. Further, he could not recall any instance where a spouse had reached the final stage in any selection process: therefore the question had not arisen. However, if spouses were to make it to the final selection stage, their applications would be considered in the light of the Staff Regulations and whether the spouse, if hired, would serve in the same line of supervision as the staff member.

3.11 The Executive Secretary was asked about the Secretariat's policy on training candidates from those Member States which had not yet ratified the Convention. He explained that, as with all appointments to posts to be filled in Phase II, the Secretariat would not as a rule select candidates from countries which had not ratified the CWC. Around the trigger point, the applications of trainee finalists from countries which had not yet ratified the Convention would be examined on a case-by-case basis. The Executive Secretary would then request substantial assurances from the Government in question, asking it to provide information confirming that it was well on its way toward ratification with only obstacles of a technical nature remaining. Applicants for the positions of Chemical Production Technologist and Chemical Production Logistician who happened to be nationals of States that had not ratified the Convention by the trigger point might, however, be considered for Group B training, which would commence after EIF.

3.12 Responding to comments that the unpredictable pace of ratifications might hamper proper planning in preparation for the conduct of the General Training Scheme and leave little time for the training centres to get ready for the influx of OPCW inspector trainees, the Executive Secretary suggested that the Commission should consider taking a decision to start training in January 1996, irrespective of the actual date of deposit of the sixty-fifth instrument of ratification. If such a decision were to be adopted by the Commission, it would provide much-needed predictability for both trainees and training centres, and would allow the recruitment process to proceed according to the most optimal time frame.

3.13 Member States confirmed that continued transparency about the recruitment process would be essential to the eventual success of this critical endeavour.