Preparatory Commission for the                                                               PC-X/24

Organisation for the Prohibition                                                               25 April 1995

of Chemical Weapons                                                                                            ENGLISH

                                                                                                                Original:   FRENCH

STATEMENT BY THE WEOG AT THE TENTH PLENARY SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

This  Session of the OPCW Preparatory Commission takes place against a backdrop of increased pace of ratifications; the members of the WEOG take comfort in this development and hope that the dynamics which seem to be at work will be amplified thus allowing for a speedy entry into force. In this context, they appreciate highly the indications from several  delegations pointing to a hastening of the ratification process in their respective countries.  The members of the WEOG have also witnessed with dismay the vicious attack in Tokyo which has led to widespread casualties; they wish to convey to the people and government of Japan their deepest sympathies and express their firm view that prompt entry into force will contribute to rendering such horrendous occurrences impossible.

The members of the WEOG appreciate the opportunity that this general debate offers to express views about the points considered by the Preparatory Commission and believe that a healthy and unrestrained exchange of views is conducive to a better understanding of the issues at stake. They would like to offer comments about some of these issues which seem to have reached prominence in the Commission's work.

The members of the WEOG have noted with great interest the various references made in statements to the Plenary on  the issue of Article XI and related concerns. They reiterate their firm belief that Article XI holds an important place in the overall balance of rights and obligations embodied in the Convention.  This balance was carefully established by the negotiators in Geneva, and the members of the WEOG believe that the Commission should not reopen an interpretative debate which does not fall within its remit. They welcome the progress achieved by the Expert Group on Technical Cooperation and Assistance in developing practical requirements for the development of an information system to foster development of chemical industry for peaceful purposes and are convinced this bears witness to the seriousness with which the members of the Commission are committed to the implementation of Article XI. The WEOG countries are committed to full and timely implementation of all aspects of the CWC, including Article XI, and to this end, will ensure that their relevant national regulations are consistent with the object and purpose of the CWC at the time of its entry into force for each of them. They reiterate their support for free and responsible trade and believe that the use of export licensing will be a critical element in ensuring that the essential goal of the Convention-stemming the proliferation of chemical weapons will be carried out fully and effectively. This, in turn, will create the necessary conditions for increasing trade, exchange of technology, and cooperation for peaceful  purposes.

Much time has been devoted, both in plenary discussions and at WGB level, to the issue of CWPF's in the light of certain recent statements of position. The members of the WEOG believe that the CWC provides security and confidence building through its requirements for transparency and its provisions for on-site inspections. One of the most important features of the Convention is the declaration and inspection, under Articles III and V, of all chemical weapons production facilities. This requirement applies regardless of whether the facility is being used for purposes not prohibited by the Convention at the time it enters into force.

The members of the Group consider unacceptable and unfounded a recently proposed interpretation according to which buildings from which certain chemical weapons production equipment has been removed before entry into force would not be subject to systematic inspections nor to the provisions regarding conversion or destruction. This approach would lead to a situation in which many chemical weapons production facilities in the Russian Federation, including some having produced nerve gas in the thousands of tonnes, would not be subject to systematic inspection under the Convention. They are also deeply concerned at the potential precedential effect such an interpretation could have.

The members of the WEOG believe that the proposed interpretation, if pursued, would seriously weaken the Convention and international support for it. They do not believe that maintaining this proposal would serve any useful purpose.

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