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OPCW Implementation Support Branch | Training of personnel | Cooperation between National Authorities | Identification of assistance under Article X | Network of Legal Experts
1. Introduction
1.1 The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the first multilaterally negotiated arms control and disarmament treaty which seeks to eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction on a non-discriminatory basis. The international community is for the first time laying the foundation for a comprehensive verification that will be able to monitor the destruction and continued non-production of chemical weapons. By establishing a far-reaching regulatory regime for the global chemical industry, the CWC presages a new foundation for international security.
1.2 In addition the CWC offers, particularly to the developing nations, the possibility of promoting free trade in chemicals, as well as international cooperation and exchange of scientific and technical information in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under the Convention in order to enhance the economic and technological development of all States Parties.
1.3 The treaty represents a new way of dealing with disarmament and arms control issues. It contains a unique set of verification provisions which are its cornerstones. These verification provisions will be implemented by the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is on its way to being formed in The Hague.
2. The necessity for a knowledgeable National Authority
2.1 There is a realisation that, if no adequate preparation is made early in the preparation stage, some future States Parties might find themselves in breach of the Convention, albeit unintentionally. Inspections can hardly be successful unless the States Parties receiving them know the reasons behind these inspections, what is to be inspected and why, what cooperation and support the inspection teams will need, and what the limits on their mandates are. This will require personnel in all States Parties who have a thorough knowledge of the Convention and who at the same time understand the intricacies of their own governments.
2.2 The Convention also contains provisions which require all States Parties to take specific types of action, even if they are non-possessors of chemical weapons. For example, States Parties are required to make declarations in two stages: first on an initial and then on an annual basis. This is applicable even if a State Party has no declarable activities - a State Party that does not possess any chemical weapons must state this in its initial declaration and a State Party that has had no production of declarable chemicals during the previous year must state this in its annual declaration.
2.3 Another example of a provision that requires action is that relating to assistance in case of use or threat of use of chemical weapons. Every State Party has to commit itself to providing assistance in at least one of three ways in the unfortunate event of help being required by another State Party. It is also recognised that every State Party has a right to request assistance should it be subjected to attacks or threats of attacks with chemical weapons. Both the pledging and the requesting of assistance require knowledge of the Convention's provisions on these subjects.
2.4 Furthermore it is in the interest of every State Party to be aware of all the activities of the Secretariat and the benefits that can be derived from being a State Party. To ensure that a State Party can benefit to the maximum extent possible, it is essential that a given National Authority should be in a position to identify and inform potential end-users of the services of the Secretariat.
2.5 The structure and size of the National Authority will vary depending on whether a State Party has chemical weapons or not, and on the size of its declarable chemical industry. A possessor State Party with a sophisticated chemical industry, for example, needsan elaborate organisation to meet the requirements of the Convention. However, for a State Party with no chemical weapons and with little or no declarable chemical industry, a small office with one or two people is sufficient. In many instances there would be little need to establish a new agency to fulfil the requirement for a National Authority; instead an already existing organisation or agency could be designated as the National Authority.
2.6 Even if a State Party has no declarable facilities and thus would not be subject to routine inspections, the theoretical possibility of a challenge inspection still exists. The National Authority must thus be capable of dealing with the reception of such an inspection.
3. The selection of personnel for the National Authority
3.1 It is clear that, even if a National Authority consists of only a single officer, such a person must be familiar with the Convention and its various provisions. In addition such an officer must be familiar, not only with the internal workings of the government administration, but also with the various areas of the economy where information relevant to the declaration process is generated. The need for thorough training of such a person can thus hardly be over-emphasised, as this officer will have to deal with such diverse areas as the chemical industry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Legal Affairs, the Customs Department, the Ministry of Defence, the Department of Statistics, etc.
3.2 The choice of the right person to be trained is of crucial importance. This choice will obviously depend upon the Member State and upon the availability of suitable candidates within the various organs of the State. On the one hand, many Member States already have desk officers within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have been dealing with CWC issues and are familiar with the subject. This might be the natural choice for a Member State. On the other hand, many Member States have scientific advisory offices and might opt for an officer in such an organisation.
3.3 The individual appointed in this capacity must be capable of disseminating the knowledge acquired and the information obtained from any training course. Whereas it would help if the person who is to be in charge of the National Authority office has chemical knowledge, particularly if the State has a sizeable chemical industry, the most important attribute of any person in charge of a National Authority is the ability to know where and how to access relevant information.
3.4 Another important consideration for the choice of a person to be trained for National Authority duties is continuity. It is understood that it cannot be guaranteed that once a person has been trained he/she will remain in the same job indefinitely. Whoever is trained must therefore be capable of imparting the knowledge thus gained to others who are likely to succeed him/her in the event of promotion or transfer.
4. The curriculum of an international basic course for personnel of National Authorities
4.1 In 1994 the Expert Group on Technical Cooperation and Assistance developed a course curriculum intended for future personnel of National Authorities. In July/August of that year the Kingdom of the Netherlands, at its own expense, hosted 2 courses which closely followed the course curriculum developed by the Expert Group. One course was four weeks long and the other was a shorter two-week course. Both courses were attended by 76 participants, mainly from developing countries.
4.2 The success of the 1994 training course for National Authorities under the auspices of the Kingdom of the Netherlands made clear the value of extending the programme. The Commission therefore approved a line in its 1995, 1996 and 1997 budgets for running similar courses. Also in the OPCW budgets from 1997 and onwards, money has been allocated for courses for personnel of National Authorities as part of the programme for support of National Authorities.
4.3 Two main types of courses have been given: One with a duration of three weeks and one with a duration of five - seven course days. The curricula of both types of courses have followed the same pattern, although the numer of hours allocated to the different subjects has varied.
4.4 The first part begins with an overview of the history of chemical warfare, including the threat of chemical weapons and the history of CW disarmament efforts. It then continues with an introduction to the CWC, including its objectives and purposes, its benefits, and sources of information on it. The OPCW is presented in some detail, including material on the Paris Resolution and the Preparatory Commission, the OPCW as prescribed by the CWC, the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat.
4.5 In the second part the legal rights and obligations of a State Party under the CWC are described, including an overview of legislative and administrative measures a State Party can take to meet its obligations.
4.6 A section on data handling and confidentiality, including an introduction to database handling, data security, confidentiality, the importance of information collection, data collection and PC software applications, is aimed at giving the participants enough background, inter alia to enable an evaluation of the extent to which and the way in which their respective National Authorities could be computerised.
4.7 To enable National Authorities to submit correct and timely declarations, one section deals with the identification of declarable activities and facilities. Another section deals with operational tasks relating to declarations, including initial declarations under Article III and initial and annual declarations under Article VI and the Verification Annex, Parts VI - IX.
4.8 Other subjects covered by the second part include assistance and investigations of alleged use, international cooperation as well as a discussion of unresolved issues.
4.9 The third section deals with verification matters. This part begins with an account of how to receive inspections, including a State Party's rights and obligations in relation to the inspection. The inspection process, including the scope of the verification, CWC inspection requirements, inspectors' rights and obligations and monitoring and sampling, is presented as perceived by the National Authority. Challenge inspections, a subject of considerable importance, is covered by the section on Article IX of the Convention. (Investigations of alleged use, including what to look for when deciding whether an event might have natural explanations, are covered in the second part of the course).
4.10 Case studies are also simulated and participants get the opportunity to come to grips with various verification scenarios involving National Authority decision-making. The case studies developed for this course could possibly also be of use in courses at a regional or national level.
5. National training of personnel of National Authorities
5.1 The curriculum of the course for personnel of National Authorities is comprehensive and covers virtually all aspects that are likely to be encountered by an agency trying to perform its duties. It goes beyond the requirements of most agencies. There are, however, areas which are country-specific, i.e. the information taught to the personnel of the National Authority must be adjusted to deal with the specific circumstances prevalent in the country.
5.2 As most National Authorities will be very small, there might not be any need to set up formal courses to meet national, country-specific training needs in such cases. It may be sufficient to identify existing entities or even individual persons who could provide the desired information and who could also arrange a one- or two-day meeting for informal discussions on issues of relevance to the National Authority in question.
5.3 The most important country-specific areas will vary from one Member State to another. Examples of country-specific areas that would often be of importance include:
5.4 A considerable amount of material already exists that could be used for a self-study type of training. The material prepared for the more recent courses for personnel involved in the national implementation of the Convention can be made available at a nominal cost. Many of the compilations of material presented at regional seminars will also provide useful assistance during self-studies involving personnel of National Authorities.
6. Conclusions
6.1 It is obvious that the CWC is different from other multilaterally negotiated agreements in one important respect - it cannot simply be signed, ratified and forgotten. As a matter of priority Member States must, therefore, ascertain that their National Authorities personnel are adequately trained to deal with the many facets of the Convention that will or might arise not only after EIF but in advance of it.
6.2 A first priority is to set up or identify an organisation to be the National Authority. The courses given by the Secretariat would be meaningless for a Member State if it did not send personnel who would eventually put the knowledge gained to good use after EIF. It is therefore hoped that Member States will give priority to consideration of setting up their National Authority in order to derive maximum benefit from the training.
6.3 Member States should also consider having courses run on a sub-regional basis. While courses involving participants from all regional groups are very useful in that they enable participants to have a global view of the Convention, smaller courses run on a sub-regional basis would offer the added advantage that all participants would have common interests. The participants in such courses could also form the nucleus for sub-regional cooperation between National Authorities.
6.4 Another form of training which could be very effective would be to request the Secretariat to offer advice to individual National Authorities. While it would not be feasible for Secretariat staff to visit each individual Member State on demand, the Secretariat might in certain instances combine such visits with, for example, attending regional seminars or visiting other Member States in the same region.
OPCW Implementation Support Branch | Training of personnel | Cooperation between National Authorities | Identification of assistance under Article X | Network of Legal Experts