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OPCW Implementation Support Branch | Training of personnel | Cooperation between National Authorities | Identification of assistance under Article X | Network of Legal Experts

Cooperation Between National Authorities

1. Introduction

1.1 The Convention requires each State Party to designate or establish a National Authority as the national focal point for effective liaison with the OPCW and other States Parties. The Organisation is to be notified of the designation or establishment of a National Authority when the Convention enters into force for a State Party.

1.2 The National Authority plays a primary role in fulfilling a State Party's obligations under the Convention. These obligations range from filing declarations and receiving inspections to ensuring that a State Party's contribution to the budget of the Organisation is made promptly. In the absence of an available precedent which could be followed while a National Authority is being set up, a sharing of experiences in this area among Member States would appear to be a beneficial exercise.

2. Regional and sub-regional cooperation

2.1 The most obvious area for cooperation at a regional or even sub-regional level appears to be in the field of training of personnel of National Authorities. Many Member States in a region, and especially in a sub-region, usually have considerable similarities in terms of, for example, the structure of their chemical industry, economic development and trade patterns, and may thus face similar problems when implementing the Convention. A sub-regional course could be tailored to the specific needs of the participants rather than having to attempt to address all possible aspects in a comprehensive way.

2.2 Another important argument in favour of regional or sub-regional cooperation in the field of training of personnel of National Authorities is the language aspect. The working language for courses in The Hague is usually English, whereas at a regional level it would be preferable and possible to give courses in a language common to the region or sub-region.

2.3 The actual conduct of a regional or sub-regional course will usually require that one Member State to declare itself willing to host the course and to take care of the practical arrangements, such as finding a suitable venue and arranging for accommodation, possibly at its own expense. The Secretariat is generally able to provide assistance in compiling a tailor-made curriculum, identifying suitable teachers, etc.

2.4 Although the exchange of implementation experiences at a global level is of importance, it is even more valuable at the regional and sub-regional level because of the similarities in the problems the National Authorities might be facing. A natural opportunity would be during or in conjunction with the present type of regional seminars, or possibly even during regional meetings that could replace the present seminars.

2.5 One area of interest could be experiences of the implementation of Article XI. As was stated above, many Member States in the same region, and especially in the same sub-region, usually have considerable similarities in terms of, for example the structure of their chemical industry, economic development and trade patterns. This makes it likely that their experiences of Article XI implementation could also be relevant to others in the region and would thus be of common interest.

2.6 Under the Convention, each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and has the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning means of protection against chemical weapons. However, to a large extent the means of protection against chemical weapons are the same as the means of protection against many very toxic chemicals. Thus, such an exchange would in essence be an exchange directed towards protection against toxic chemicals.

2.7 There are advantages in establishing such an exchange not only at the global level, but also at a regional or sub-regional level. The proper design of protective equipment, and especially personal protective equipment, depends on the climate in the area where it is going to be used, and at least in sub-regions one might expect climatic similarities. Furthermore, the exchange could take place in a language common to the region or sub-region. A possibility to promote such an exchange would be to arrange symposia, seminars or workshops on various aspects of protection against toxic chemicals with the participation of personnel of National Authorities as well as various experts, possibly also from outside the region.

2.8 Unfortunately, old chemical munitions without known or identifiable ancestry are still being discovered all over the world. Such munitions are generally in a very poor condition and might pose a severe health hazard to the population in the vicinity as well as to any personnel tasked to deal with the munitions. A regional resource could be set up to enable National Authorities to deal rapidly with any limited finding of old, unidentifiable chemical munitions in a safe and responsible way.

2.9 A very important and also very useful form of regional cooperation would be the establishment of a regional network of National Authorities, e.g. through Internet, which is now available in most States at a reasonable cost. This would enable National Authorities, when a new problem arises, to quickly contact others that might have experienced the same or a similar type of problem and may already have found a solution to it. The Secretariat might possibly assist in facilitating the establishment of such networks, but it is desirable that Member States in the actual region undertake the primary responsibility for this.

2.10 If a Secretariat electronic information service is set up, this service could include "newsgroups" or similar fora, also on a regional basis. Thus, National Authorities of a region could gain access, through use of a password, to a "newsgroup" in which issues of common interest could be discussed in real time.

3. Bilateral cooperation

3.1 Most National Authorities have very little, if any, practical experience of receiving inspection teams. At the same time it is highly desirable that the very first inspection proceeds smoothly, particularly if it happens to be a challenge inspection.

3.2 It is always possible for a National Authority to arrange national mock or trial inspections. However, experiences of earlier national trial inspections show that it is very difficult to simulate the situation that would occur during an inspection with multilateral participation.

3.3 One way to gain the desirable inspection experience in a low-key way would be through bilateral agreements on mutual trial inspections. Such trial inspections, especially if trial challenge inspections, do not have to take place at sensitive locations. It is the inspection procedures that are of primary importance, not the inspected site itself.

3.4 States could enter into bilateral cooperation agreements on the collection of export and import data, e.g. for declarations of Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals. In its simplest form such an agreement could mean that the National Authority of the exporting State promises to notify the National Authority of the importing State of any export of chemicals which has to be declared under the Convention. In the same way, the National Authority of the importing State undertakes to notify the National Authority of the exporting State of any import, declarable under the Convention, of which it has not already given notification.

3.5 States could also enter into bilateral agreements on mutual assistance in the case of chemical catastrophes. Such agreements could include many elements, such as:

3.6 A logical starting point might be the assistance a State has pledged or will pledge to provide under Article X, paragraphs 7 (b) and (c) in case of use of chemical weapons. A State could also agree to provide this assistance, on a bilateral basis, in the case of other types of disaster caused by the release of toxic chemicals.

3.7 In case of a chemical catastrophe a major concern might be how to obtain information on the properties of the chemicals involved and on suitable measures to counter their effects. Information on means of protection could be obtained from the data bank maintained by the Secretariat, although this might be more time-consuming than desirable in case of a catastrophe. An alternative could be the joint establishment of poison information centres. This could be done on a bilateral or even sub-regional basis as long as all participants have a common working language, face similar types of chemical risks and have similar resources to combat any accidents or catastrophes. It goes without saying that such joint poison information centres would also be an asset in the handling of chemical accidents on a small scale.

4. Increased national security through regional and bilateral cooperation

4.1 Lack of information on the intention and objective behind a certain action of a State can result in another State perceiving this action as a threat to its national security. One example would be an action that could be interpreted as not being in compliance with the Convention. This contingency has been foreseen in the Convention, and paragraph 2 of Article IX requires States Parties to provide clarification in such situations:

"Without prejudice to the right of any State Party to request a challenge inspection, States Parties should, whenever possible, first make every effort to clarify and resolve, through exchange of information and consultations among themselves, any matter which may cause doubt about compliance with this Convention, or which gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous. A State Party which receives a request from another State Party for clarification of any matter which the requesting State Party believes causes such a doubt or concern shall provide the requesting State Party as soon as possible, but in any case not later than 10 days after the request, with information sufficient to answer the doubt or concern raised along with an explanation of how the information provided resolves the matter. Nothing in this Convention shall affect the right of any two or more States Parties to arrange by mutual consent for inspections or any other procedures among themselves..."

4.2 It is helpful that a formal mechanism exists for the alleviation of concerns relating to compliance with the Convention. However, it would be even better if such concerns never arose in the first place. To this end, States Parties could enter into regional or bilateral agreements on the voluntary provision of information, without previous request, on matters that could be foreseen to possibly give rise to concerns in relation to the Convention.

4.3 The following are some examples of information that could be provided voluntarily under regional or bilateral agreements:

4.4 Other types of regionally or bilaterally agreed measures could also be envisaged, to increase the transparency of actions that could be perceived as related to the Convention. One example of such a measure would be to invite representatives of other States Parties to observe military manoeuvres involving chemical protection gear.

5. Cooperation between National Authorities and international organisations in the fields of chemistry and the chemical industry

5.1 Some international non-governmental organisations take an interest in the Convention, and are at the same time in a position to provide expert advice. One such example is the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC), which has set up a task force on the destruction of chemical weapons. Another is the European association of chemical industries (CEFIC), which closely followed the CWC negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

5.2 National Authorities could cooperate with such international organisations in many areas, ranging from identifying suitable teachers for courses to obtaining expert advice on how to destroy suddenly discovered remnants of old chemical weapons or other toxic chemicals.

6. Conclusion

6.1 Cooperation among National Authorities will create greater awareness about the Convention, will facilitate its smooth functioning after entry into force, and could actually contribute to an increase in national security. Such cooperation can be pursued in many ways. The foregoing is simply an indicative list of some of the possibilities.

6.2 The Secretariat can assist in many ways by facilitating cooperation among National Authorities. The initiative for such cooperation must, however, come from the Member States/States Parties themselves.

OPCW Implementation Support Branch | Training of personnel | Cooperation between National Authorities | Identification of assistance under Article X | Network of Legal Experts