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OPCW Implementation Support Branch | Training of personnel | Cooperation between National Authorities | Identification of assistance under Article X | Network of Legal Experts
1. Introduction
1.1 The entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention did not by itself eliminate the threat or even the actual use of chemical weapons. Some States Parties will retain parts of their chemical weapons stockpile, though in decreasing quantities, during the ten (or fifteen) years destruction period while some other States having a chemical weapons capability may decide not to join the Convention at all. The possibility of a State Party acting in violation of the Convention cannot also be totally excluded.
1.2. In order to meet these concerns and to ensure the undiminished security of States Parties Article X relating to the provision of assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons was included in the Convention.
2. Definition of "Assistance"
2.1 "Assistance" has been defined in the Article as meaning the coordination and delivery to States Parties of protection against chemical weapons, including, inter alia, detection equipment and alarm systems; protective equipment; medical antidotes and treatments; decontamination equipment and decontaminants; and advice on protective measures. Assistance can be provided by the Organisation and by States Parties not only after chemical weapons have been used against a State Party but even where there is a threat of use of such weapons.
3. Categories of Assistance
3.1 The Convention refers to three categories of assistance, the distinction between them depending upon the timing of the delivery of assistance in response to a given situation. The three categories are:
4. When Can Assistance Be Requested and Provided
4.1 Each State Party has the right to request and receive assistance and protection in accordance with established procedures in any one or more of the following situations:
4.2 It can sometimes be difficult to tell whether chemical weapons have actually been used or if the observed events have natural explanations. When requesting assistance it might therefore sometimes be proper not to use too categorical statements about the alleged use.
5. Who Will Provide Assistance
5.1 Each State Party is under the obligation to provide assistance through the Organisation in any one or more of the following ways:
By contributing to the voluntary fund for assistance that was established at the First Conference of the States Parties. The fund consists of monetary contributions only, collected from States Parties, NGOs, institutions, private parties or individuals and is administered by the Technical Secretariat under the supervision of the Executive Council;
By concluding with the Organisation, if possible not later than 180 days after the Convention enters into force for it, an agreement concerning the procurement, upon demand, of assistance. Such an agreement can specify the category, type, quantity and availability of assistance. A model for an agreement is available for use by States Parties; and
By declaring, not later than 180 days after the Convention enters into force for it, the kind of assistance it might provide in response to an appeal by the Organisation. If, for some reason, a State Party is subsequently unable to provide assistance in accordance with its declaration, it is still under the obligation to provide assistance. In such a situation a State Party may either provide assistance other than what it had declared or opt for any one or both of the other two options, e.g. the voluntary fund or an agreement with the Organisation.
6. Request for Assistance
6.1 The request for assistance is to be submitted to the Director-General of the Organisation. In order to enable the Organisation and States Parties to provide the most appropriate form of assistance it is important that the request should contain all relevant information pertaining to the event that has led to the complaint. In the Verification Annex, Part XI, paragraph 3, the minimum contents of a request for an investigation of an allegation of use of chemical weapons is specified. Requests for assistance because of other reasons should, to the extent applicable, contain the same information.
6.2 The request must identify the State Party on whose territory use of chemical weapons is alleged to have taken place.
6.3 An investigation of alleged use should, to the extent possible, include a visit to the site(s) of the alleged use. Therefore, the request should indicate a safe way for the investigation team to reach the site(s).
6.4 Often the site(s) of the alleged use is (are) in a war zone and what can be considered a safe way to reach the site(s) will vary from one hour to another. Then, an alternative might be to indicate how to reach, e.g. the capital and suggest that it be used as a base for trips into the field to the extent possible under the circumstances.
Location
6.5 The request should identify the site(s) where chemical weapons are alleged to have been used. The precise geographical location should be given, preferably by co-ordinates at least to the nearest minute (this roughly corresponds to the nearest 1-1.5 km). If co-ordinates are not available, distance and direction to a readily identifiable, well-known place could be given.
6.6 The area where the use is alleged to have taken place should also, if possible, be briefly described as regards topography, area utilisation and vegetation type.
6.7 A location description could read as follows: "The use took place just outside the village of Abababa, located at N 00.00, E 00.00. The area is flat, mainly containing farmlands for ... cultivation and some grazing areas but also a few ... forests. Except for the village of Abababa, with 500 inhabitants, there are no settlements in the area".
Date and time
6.8 The request must specify when the use is alleged to have taken place. It is highly desirable that not only the date but also the hour is provided. If the use is alleged to have taken place repeatedly, the date and time of each instance should be given.
6.9 If precise information is available it should be included in the request, e.g. "155 mm artillery shells from a position 10 km N of the affected area", "200 kg parachute-retarded aerial bombs, equipped with impact fuses, dropped from an altitude of about 4000 meters by ... bombers".
6.10 If only general information is available, this will have to suffice. It is, however, important that the information be detailed enough to allow for, in combination with other information in the request, a distinction between possible use of chemical weapons and possible use of other types of weapons, such as obscurating smoke and incendiaries. 6.11 It should be indicated if samples of unexploded or fragments of exploded munitions can be made available to the investigation team. Generally, if the site can be safely reached it is preferable to leave such pieces or fragments at the site rather than to bring them to, e.g. the capital. Leaving, e.g. an unexploded aerial bomb in place at the site might allow the investigation team to make important observations and would provide a better opportunity for ascertaining a chain of custody for any samples from the very beginning.
6.12 Description(s) of the alleged attack(s) should be provided to give an indication of the extent of use. The descriptions might include the size of the area and the number of persons affected, as well as details on how the attacks were carried out.
6.13 It should also be indicated if eyewitnesses to the alleged attacks can be made available to an investigation team and, if so, which language(s) the eyewitnesses speak and whether interpretation can be provided.
Characteristics and effects
6.14 Any available information of the type of chemical alleged to be used should be included in the request. The information could be direct, e.g. results of use of CW detection equipment, or indirect, e.g. effects on humans, animals and vegetation.
6.15 Observed medical symptoms should be described. If the affected persons have been treated by medically qualified personnel, it is essential that these personnel take part in the preparation of the symptoms description. In the first request it should suffice to describe the more important symptoms or a few typical cases. Detailed compilations can wait until the arrival of an investigation team.
6.16 However, if known, the availability of medically affected alleged victims as well as of medical records relating to the effects they have suffered should be included in the request. Also the availability of corpses for autopsies, of samples taken during autopsies and of autopsy records is of importance for the planning and conduct of an investigation and should be indicated.
6.17 Any observed effects on animals and vegetation of the alleged use of chemical weapons should be included in the request for an investigation.
Specific assistance requests
6.18 To the extent possible the specific needs for assistance should be presented in the request. This could include requests for equipment, assistance teams, medical teams, pharmaceuticals and medical consumables, etc.
General remarks
6.19 When preparing a request for assistance the time element is of critical importance. It is better to lodge an incomplete request within hours and later supplement it with additional information as it becomes available, rather than wait for days until a complete request can be filed.
6.20 However, this does not mean that a request for assistance should be submitted whenever the slightest suspicion of use of chemical weapons arises. It is a politically very serious accusation to claim that an adversary is using chemical weapons and, unless the allegation is well-founded, it can backfire.
6.21 Many events in wartime might at first be difficult to explain in terms of earlier experiences. People with very little knowledge of the effects of chemical weapons might be inclined to ascribe strange observations to the result of use of such weapons. Obscurating smokes, for example, can be highly irritating and, when used indoors, can prove fatal. For a person with a limited knowledge of chemical weapons the use of such smoke may be wrongly interpreted as the use of chemical weapons.
6.22 The Technical Secretariat will always be prepared to give advice on whether observations might be due to the use of chemical weapons or might have other explanations.
7. Response to a Request for Assistance
7.1 Three types of assistance can be provided depending upon the facts and circumstances of each request.
7.2 Where the nature of the complaint involves a threat of a chemical attack humanitarian assistance can be provided by States Parties. Such assistance can include detection equipment, alarm systems and protective gear. The Organisation can offer advice on improving the protective capability of the threatened State Party.
7.3 Where chemical weapons have been used emergency assistance can be provided by States Parties and by the Organisation immediately on receipt of a request and before the investigation of the complaint has been completed. Assistance under these circumstances can include protective equipment; decontamination equipment and decontaminants; medical equipment and antidotes; medical teams trained to deal with such situations.
7.4 Supplementary assistance is provided by the Organisation and by States Parties after the investigation has been completed and the Executive Council has taken a decision to that effect. Such assistance can include medical supplies, trained personnel, decontamination equipment and decontaminants, etc. It can also involve medical treatment of victims at hospitals outside the State Party that was subject to the use of chemical weapons.
8. Humanitarian assistance
8.1 The objective of providing humanitarian assistance to a State Party which may request such assistance in case of serious threat of use of chemical weapons or serious threat of use of riot control agents as a method of warfare will be to enable it to take reasonable measures of protection against such an attack.
8.2 Since the requesting State Party may only estimate its requirements of means of protection in this situation, it will be extremely difficult for the OPCW to provide such humanitarian assistance out of its own resources. It could at best, if directed by the Executive Council, despatch a suitable team of experts to advise the concerned State Party on how to take suitable protective measures. Under the circumstances the most effective course of action could be for the OPCW to examine the list of pledges of assistance received from States Parties and request the States that have promised the necessary assistance to deliver equipment that may be required to the concerned State Party.
8.3 The types of assistance that could be required include, inter alia:
These forms of assistance and the equipment they require are discussed in detail in the following section.
9. Emergency and supplementary assistance
9.1 Emergency and supplementary assistance are expected to be provided after a chemical attack has actually occurred. The objectives of such assistance for which the equipment is stockpiled, are of decisive importance for an assessment of what will be needed and also of what needs to be stored. The following are five examples of possible objectives:
9.2 One variant of this objective would be to provide medical treatment for persons who have survived a chemical attack or other exposure to chemical warfare agents, but are still at risk of permanent injury. This objective will be referred to as "late medical assistance".
9.3 Another, more far-reaching objective would be to provide immediate medical treatment, especially of a life-saving kind, to persons who have just been exposed to chemical warfare agents.
9.4 This objective, which can usually be achieved only in combination with one of the three objectives listed under 9.5 to 9.7 below, will be referred to as "early medical assistance".
9.5 The objective would be to enable persons to survive a drifting cloud of chemical warfare agents. It is assumed that the actual chemical attack has taken place elsewhere, and thus no liquid contamination will be present. It is further assumed that the gas/aerosol concentration does not reach such a level that skin protection is required. This objective will be labelled "gas protection".
9.6 The objective would be to enable persons to survive a chemical attack and to evacuate to a contamination-free area. It is assumed that, in addition to gas protection, protection against liquid contamination will also be required. However, the physical work-load during the evacuation will be limited. The objective will be referred to as "gas and liquid protection".
9.7 The objective would be to enable persons not only to survive a chemical attack even if they are present in the primary target area, but also to enable them to remain in the contaminated area and continue their activities. It is assumed that such activity would often involve hard physical work The objective will be referred to as "work in contaminated areas".
9.8 The objective would be to enable decontamination of areas, building, equipment, etc., which might have been contaminated by liquid or solid chemical warfare agents, in order to make renewed use possible without any risk to the user. This objective will be referred to as "late decontamination".
10.1 "Late decontamination" is the least time-critical form of assistance. Contamination might remain and constitute a contact hazard for long periods, especially if the ambient temperature is low and/or the free air circulation is impaired. Even weeks after the actual contamination took place, decontamination efforts might sometimes be useful.
10.2 "Late medical assistance" is usually required within a week in order to be meaningful. Exceptions do however exist, e.g. plastic surgery after mustard agent skin burns.
10.3 "Gas protection", "gas and liquid protection" and "work in contaminated areas" all require protective measures to be taken before additional chemical attacks take place. If the protection is to be effective, it must be in place when such chemical attacks occur. The protective mask will be required within seconds of the beginning of the attack or the arrival of the drifting CW cloud. Immediate personal decontamination will be needed within minutes, and so on. Thus it would be necessary to distribute the protective equipment to everybody who might be affected by a CW attack.
10.4 "Early medical assistance" also requires advance preparations for the protective measures. However, the equipment, with the exception of an auto injector and possible prophylactic pharmaceuticals, does not have to be distributed to everybody, but would stay with the medical emergency assistance teams. Such teams must be positioned so that they can reach any victims of a chemical attack or drifting CW cloud within a very short time, preferably in less than 10-20 minutes.
11.1 Late decontamination will mainly require heavy decontamination equipment and, in many cases, decontamination chemicals. Some detection equipment will usually be required to locate contamination and to verify the decontamination result. The team(s) carrying out the decontamination will need personal protection equipment. It should usually be possible to first send an investigation team in order to ascertain exactly what is required.
11.2 Late medical assistance will require pharmaceuticals and medical equipment depending on the precise nature of the chemical injuries. Neither personal protection equipment should be necessary for the medical team, nor should detection or decontamination equipment be needed.
11.3 Early medical assistance will require antidotes for all possible chemical warfare agents that might be used, as well as certain medical equipment, e.g. for artificial respiration. Prophylactic pharmaceuticals might also be needed. Detection equipment will be needed, for assessing whether patients are contaminated, for locating contamination-free areas, and for detecting the presence of any CW cloud. Decontamination of patients as well as of team members and certain equipment might be necessary. Team members will require personal protection equipment. In the most advanced form of the early medical assistance objective a field hospital equipped with chemical protection would be highly desirable.
11.4 Gas protection essentially requires a protective mask for everybody, possibly equipment to ensure that the mask fits, and detection equipment.
11.5 In addition to the equipment for gas protection, gas and liquid protection also requires light, expendable impermeable covers for body, hands and shoes to protect from liquid contamination. Equipment, at least for personal decontamination, is highly desirable.
11.6 Work in contaminated areas demands an essentially complete system of chemical protection equipment. Full detection and decontamination facilities, and equipment for early medical assistance would be needed in addition to what is required for gas protection, including permeable protective suits.
12.1 The shelf-life of chemical protection equipment varies considerably. Many chemicals, e.g. for decontamination and detection, might have deteriorated to the point of uselessness within a few years. Representative shelf-lives for rubber and other polymeric materials used inter alia in protective masks could be around 10-20 years.
12.2 Shelf-life is temperature-dependent. If the average temperature at which equipment is stored increases by 10 C, the shelf-life is usually cut in half. Thus storage in tropical areas might require refrigeration.
12.3 The shelf-life is usually shortened by the presence of humidity unless the equipment is packed in perfectly diffusion-proof wrapping. Water adsorption can sometimes be the limiting factor for the shelf-life of equipment based on activated carbon (filter canisters, permeable protective suits, etc.).
13. Maintenance Aspects
13.1 Most mechanical and electronic equipment requires regular maintenance. The maintenance must often be carried out by personnel specifically trained for that purpose. If a variety of equipment requiring maintenance were donated by States Parties and stored under the control and responsibility of the OPCW, the maintenance problem might become insurmountable.
13.2 By contrast, very little maintenance if any at all is required for most other forms of protection equipment. Protective masks and clothing, manual detection equipment, chemicals for decontamination, etc., can be stored without maintenance provided that the storage facility is reasonably dry, cool, and frost-free.
14. Selection of Storage Site(s)
14.1 Two main, not mutually exclusive, alternatives exist:
14.2 Immediate dispatch of equipment for such emergency assistance would be facilitated if it is stored under control of the OPCW. OPCW has thus establish its own stockpile of protective equipment to outfit a limited number of assistance teams and persons. This equipment is of the same type as the protective equipment used by the inspectors and inspection assistants, and is stored and maintained at the same place.
14.3 Protective equipment for large groups of persons would continue to be stored with the Donor States Parties at their expense and responsibility. 15. Training Aspects15.1 Little training is necessary for the use of equipment required to provide gas protection to larger groups. Locally recruited personnel could be trained by a specialist within hours so that they, in turn, could distribute the protective masks, etc., and give instructions on their use.
15.2 The use of equipment by assistance teams often requires quite extensive training. However, at the same time it can often be assumed that an assistance team is made up of specialists who already possess the required skills.
OPCW Implementation Support Branch | Training of personnel | Cooperation between National Authorities | Identification of assistance under Article X | Network of Legal Experts